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JUN 26 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: NSC Progress Report on the FI Program

REFERENCE: Your memorandum to DD/P dated 3 June 1953

Pursuant to your request, Sections VIII and XII (paragraphs) of IAC-D-55/3 (Final), 6 February 1953, subject "The Foreign Intelligence Program," have been revised to conform to present conditions. These revisions entitled as follows are attached:

1. Psychological Intelligence

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2. Espionage
(Prepared by FI)

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FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director, Plans

Attachments

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Espionage

1. Since the submission of the previous progress report, the difficulties incident to the collection of covert intelligence within the Soviet and Satellite orbit remain unchanged. Basic control procedures exercised by the various opposition security services make it more and more apparent that "black" penetration of denied areas is increasingly hazardous, and because of its illegal nature does not insure accessibility to strategic targets. In addition, the pressure of these control procedures is a continuing and serious threat to the limited assets painfully created by successful operations in the past. Although the situation is relatively less critical in Satellite areas, particularly East Germany, recent events may even endanger this coverage.

2. In an effort to meet this situation the covert mechanism has maintained a high degree of flexibility in order that all possible avenues of approach are carefully examined in relation to changing conditions.

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These contingencies do not permit an optimistic outlook but represent a possible alternative, and perhaps in time may serve to avoid an almost complete dependence on illegal entry.

3. Suffice it to say that progress in the delicate and highly specialized field of covert intelligence collection is hardly perceptible on a short-range reporting base and significant successes in the immediate future do not now seem likely. At the same time meaningful and usable intelligence is being produced, support facilities developed and strengthened, and valuable experience, both in operations and career development of personnel, is being acquired.

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